Introducing a new cloud system creates new identities, network paths, data stores, logging sources, deployment permissions, and supplier dependencies. A security review should answer two questions: can it perform its business function, and can the organization prove that access, data movement, monitoring, and recovery remain controlled?
Start with a simple data-flow and trust-boundary map. Identify the cloud account or subscription, regions, virtual networks, public endpoints, private services, management planes, CI/CD systems, identity provider, secrets store, object storage, databases, queues, and third-party connections. Mark where data is created, transformed, cached, replicated, exported, and deleted. Separate administrative traffic from customer or workload traffic. This prevents a review from focusing on the visible application while missing a privileged pipeline, a temporary firewall rule, or a backup copy outside the original design.
Inventory human users, groups, workload identities, API keys, federated roles, break-glass accounts, vendor access, and automation credentials. For each, document permissions, MFA, expiry, ownership, and logging. Review both the cloud control plane and application plane: a restricted console role does not compensate for a service account that can read every tenant’s objects.
Compare intended exposure with route tables, security groups, firewall policies, load balancer listeners, private endpoints, and DNS. A public service may be necessary, but its management interface, database, metadata endpoint, and administrative ports should not become public as a side effect. Check egress too: unrestricted outbound access can enable data theft or unapproved code retrieval.
For multi-tenant or shared systems, test isolation with the same identity and object identifiers a normal request uses. Review authorization at the API, database, cache, file, queue, and background-job layers. Confirm that logs and support tools do not expose one customer’s data to another customer or to a broadly privileged operator.
List the events required to investigate an incident: authentication, privilege changes, policy changes, key use, data export, object access, deployment activity, impersonation, and destructive operations. Confirm that logs reach a protected destination, use synchronized time, and cannot be modified by the actor. Check retention against investigation and compliance needs.
Do not stop at “logging enabled.” Generate representative events and trace them from the source service to the alert, dashboard, ticket, or on-call notification. Record detection delay, missing fields, duplicate alerts, and the owner responsible for triage. Evidence that cannot identify the actor, resource, timestamp, source address, or resulting change is often insufficient during a real incident.
Inspect infrastructure-as-code, pipeline permissions, approval gates, artifact provenance, image scanning, dependency controls, and rollback. Confirm that a deployment cannot bypass review by changing the pipeline, state store, or policy package in the same change. Separate release and emergency access.
Map backups to the actual workload: databases, object storage, queues, configuration, secrets, certificates, identity settings, and infrastructure state. Verify encryption, retention, deletion protection, isolation, and restore permissions. Restore into an isolated environment and test authentication, transactions, integrations, monitoring, and access revocation. A successful backup job is not proof of recoverability.
For each finding, record the affected asset, evidence, likelihood, business impact, existing control, owner, due date, and compensating measure. Classify the result as accepted, remediated, blocked, or requiring a design change. Avoid vague conclusions such as “cloud security is good”; state which paths were tested, which assumptions remain, and what should be retested after the next release.
Informatix Systems can help review cloud architecture, identity, network exposure, monitoring, migration controls, and recovery readiness. The appropriate depth depends on the platform, data sensitivity, regulatory obligations, service objectives, and the organization’s ability to operate the controls. Contact Informatix Systems with the architecture diagram, known constraints, and the evidence already collected.